Élections régionales 2021 pays de la loire

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See all articles Voting approaches in Regional français Elections: a Democratic device that has come to be Dangerous

Two round majority crème elections — a français exception?

The “mixed” electoral système used pour regional French choisir is an exception within Europe. In auto vast majority du European union member claims — such ont Germany, Belgium, Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands — a simple round proportional election is used for electing regional assemblies. Seulement un Greece shares the français system de using a deux round, majority prime system.

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Since their création in 1986, France’s regional councils were life elected according à a proportional system (used three times between 1986 et 1998) and then, because 2003, through a mixed system which combine proportional distribution et majority crème in a two-round ballot. This “tailor-made” choice method, i beg your pardon is various than je vous demande pardon is used parce que le the intérieur Assembly et departmental councils (two-round binominal system), ont well ont the europe Parliament (single-round proportional election) is similar à that i m sorry is used par town councils du cities over 1,000 occupants where thé majority bonus is higher (50%).


The principle of this système is oui follows: during the sapin round de the election, voters will certainly vote for a single list, presented par a seul party or, frequently, a ligue of several partie based nous a pre-election agreement. Unless a list wins much more than 50% of votes — i m sorry was not the boîte in any region in 2015, and only one in 2010 (Guadeloupe) — ne sont pas seats will be vested at this stage. During the second round, only lists the won at least 10% de votes cast in the tons round (7% in Corsica) have the right to continue; perform earning at least 5% du votes are enabled to combinaison with one du the lists autorisé to the seconde round. At auto end ns this seconde round, seats are dispersed in the following way: thé list with auto most voix receives a majority bonus corresponding venir 25% de seats (18% in Corsica, 20% in Martinique et French Guiana), and the staying 75% ns seats room proportionally divided among the parties that made it to the seconde round. Parce que le the seat which are proportionally distributed, the “highest averages” rule (the D’Hondt method) is used. Finally, elected councilors are chosen in different departmental sections proportional to how their lists score in the different departments action n° 2003-327 de 11 avril 2003 relative à l’élection des conseillers régional et des représentants à Parlement européen ainsi qu’à l’aide publique de partis politiques, JORF n°87 indigenous 12 April 2003."> 1 .

Origins in the 1998 crisis

Second image: regional council du Haute-Normandie (1998)

This particular electoral système was developed in the early 2000s in response to a situation of normal institutional deadlock complying with a decade of progressively eroding bipartisanship.

On in march 16, 1986, thé assemblies du the recently created french regions were chosen through a single-round proportional election, v a threshold de 5%. Nous the exact same day, legislative élection took place which, in keeping with President françois Mitterand’s agenda, likewise followed thé proportional system. These stade précoce regional choisir gave a majority of seats to the center-right bloc (Rassemblement convecteur la République or RPR, Union pour la démocratie Française or UDF and allies) in two regions. In auto nine est différent regions, except à la Corsica, auto strong showing ns the national Front (le Front national or FN) — which won 9.78% de votes nationwide — and occasionally of the far-left, deprived both camp of année absolute majority. In the following election de 1992, auto FN winner 13.72% du votes and the seul seven regions, under from twelve, ont a majority. 6 years later, in 1998, the FN won even an ext votes, reaching 14.94%. Native that alloue forward, except parce que le the Limousin an ar which to be carried de the left and the Pays-de-la-Loire et Basse-Normandie areas dominated par the center-right, ne sont pas region in mainland france gave thé absolute majority venir a single camp. The ingrédient of thé Haute-Normandie regional council between 1998 and 2004, in which thé balance ns power between the different bloquer are similar to the national average, illustrates this impasse. Thé left-wing bloquer (25 seat in total) et the right-wing bloc (20 seat in total) both fail venir meet auto majority du 28 seats périmé to thé presence of 10 FN deputies, i m sorry neither auto right nor thé left can ally themselves with.

Such cas are frequent in the rest of Europe, specifically in Germany et Austria whereby they often an outcome in very contractualized grand syndicat models L’ère des très Grandes syndicat et l’Allemagne ingouvernable, Le dénormes Continent, 20 April 2019."> 2 in between the main center-left (social democrats) and center-right (conservatives) parties. However, in the la france of 1998, where auto left-right division was calmer very pronounced, this solution did not meet representatives of the henchmen political parties. Provided these circumstances, the election du the presidents of the general councils — that hold auto bulk of regional executive puissance — stirred up conflict auto front national oui kingmaker… again: France’s regional choisir of 15 march 1998, Regional and Federal Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1998, p. 125-33."> le3 . In Languedoc-Rousillon, Rhone-Alpes, Picardie, and Franche-Comté, the outgoing UDF were re-elected through FN votes: the tons three accepted this nomination et were expelled from your party, while thé fourth resigned his mandate. In three other regions (Centre, Haute-Normandie, Midi-Pyrénées), auto center-right incumbents left auto regional presidencies à the ps (le la gauche Socialist) in order à avoid such a scenario. In countless assemblies, auto vote parce que le regional budgets was blocked which prompted the government to introduce année emergency legislation act n°98-135 de 7 mars 1998 relative venir fonctionnement des conseils régionaux, JORF n°57 native 8 march 1998."> 4 allowing thé adoption — without a voter — de a budget presented par the president de the local council in the absent of a stabilité majority.

Proposed in 1999 de the government du Lionel Jospin (PS), election reform acte n°99-36 aux 19 janvier 1999 relative au mode d’élection des conseillers régional et des conseillers jusqu’à l’Assemblée de Corse et à fonctionnement des conseils régionaux, JORF n°16 native 20 January 1999."> 5 had two interrelated goals: 1) offer a quasi-guarantee the a stable regional leadership might be created through the crème of 25% du seats; 33% of second-round vote being sufficient parce que le the first-place list à obtain 50% du seats and 2) maintain thé “cordon sanitaire” i beg your pardon kept thé FN away from executive responsibilities by avoiding the need for left-right agreements.

While cette is a bit vague nous the seconde goal, the bill was clear conditions météorologiques the first: “it has actually been observed, due to the fact that the sapin election ns regional councilors par direct universel suffrage, et even more soja after thé regional voter of in march 15, 1998, that auto majorities achieved by this voting système are an extremely narrow, fragmented and often unpredictable, situations that are ultimately detrimental to the assertion de the local character of our country” jm de acte relatif au mode d’élection des conseillers régional et des conseillers à l’Assemblée ns Corse et venir fonctionnement des conseils régionaux, n°975, 10 juin 1998."> 6 . The facture dachat proposed incorporating the voting system à la municipal elections et the Corsican Assembly, combining proportional et majority approaches, into thé regional framework, with avec certitude modifications.

Justification for reform — 4 conditions

At the very least four elements contributed à justifying this reform: a) a pronounced left-right division; b) the FN’s inability à win in the lundi round; c) the certainty that at least une list would victory 33% du votes in the lundi round; d) the fear du instability i m sorry has identified France’s political système since 1958.

Each du these four elements contribute in a crucial way to the relevance ns the embraced measures:

Without together a strong two-party system, executive alliance probably could ont been formed in between center-left et center-right parties in regions with ne sont pas natural majority. Together a culture of coalitions, i beg your pardon is an extremely noticeable in Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands à la example, is not found in modern-day France. Auto long-standing attitude of mutual rejection practiced de French socialists et conservatives, either ns whom were sure to win thé majority ns power in the seconde round de each denchères election, contributed venir this situation lasting until 2015.If thé FN had remained in a emplacement to success the seconde round in certain regions in 1998, thé proposed revolutionary would oui been counterproductive: in fact, de giving a 25% majority crème to thé list that come in first, the new election an approach makes it easier pour a strong FN à obtain an absolute majority. Cette would only need 33% of votes in the second round whereas much more than 50% would certainly be required in a proportional system. However at thé beginning of the 2000s, non region observed such a situation. Even in Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur where it had winner 30.08% ns votes, the FN was nearly 10 point behind auto left-wing union, i m sorry garnered 39.84% ns votes.The reform is additionally ineffective when non list wins 33% de votes in the lundi round. In that case, thé majority prime of a quarter ns the seats is no longer sufficient, and the elected assembly pouvez lack a stable majority. This scenario was extremely unlikely in 1999 once the system of français parties was centered around seul three blocs (center-left, center-right, FN). Thé 25% threshold was thus not chosen at arbitrarily — this is the précis threshold necessary to guarantee a majority in the seconde round in a three-party system. In fact, in between 2004 and 2015, thé only caisse of seconde rounds the included much more than three lists to be in la corse (seven perform in 2004, 4 in 2010 and 2015) et Guadeloupe (four in 2010), which ont their own certain party systems.

The preference à la stability at auto expense ns representativeness shown de the main french political force of thé 5th Republic played a principale role in implementing this new voting system. A clear example du this stance have the right to be uncovered in thé legislative décalage issued de the Senate in 2003 worrying a facture which would certainly reform thé way in which regional councilors to be elected: “The farming abstention rate (22.1 per des centaines in 1986, 31.3 per cent in 1992 et 41.9 per des centaines in 1998) most definitely reflects thé public’s général frustration and its rejection de the incessant negotiations the a lack de a clear bulk requires.” In the absent of serious studies nous this subject, ce is difficult à know si this is a recadrer prejudice specific venir the français political environment, année ideological pose aimed at discrediting the proportional depiction system, jaune a true récolte reality. But it is clear that without this prejudice, other solutions could oui been found. à la example, cette is faisabilité to work with a minority government. This is in no way unusual: it is approximated that in thé post-war period, around a third of governments in developed nations oui not had actually a parliamentary majority 7 . On année institutional level, the law can provide for the dissolution ns the assembly in thé event the a majority is unable à be got to within a reasonable time, ont is the case in lower Saxony Niedersächsische Verfassung, art. 30."> 8 , à la example. Another, more radical, systems is to distribute executive emplacement in proportion to auto votes received passant par the different lists. This is the “consociational” system used in Switzerland et Upper Austria Mario Draghi e ns sfida della concordanza, Il dénormes Continent, 1 march 2021."> 9 .

2015-2021: outdated conditions

At least three ns these four conditions, i m sorry were existing at thé beginning du the 2000s, are no plus long applicable 20 years later. Oui a result of the politics reorganization ns the french party system, auto “democratic device” of the two-round majority-rule voting system now needs venir be questioned.

The risk de far-right leadership

The 2015 regional élection saw thé FN knife 27.7% de votes in the sapin round and 27.1% in the second round. Anchoring itself in toutes les personnes regions of mainland France, auto far-right party finished at the top in the first round of voting in Alsace-Champagne-Ardenne-Lorraine (36.08%), in Bourgogne-Franche-Comté (31.48%), in Centre-Val de Loire (30.49%), in Languedoc-Roussillon-Midi-Pyrénées (31.8%), in Nord-Pas-de-Calais-Picardie (40.64%), and in Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur (40.55%).

In Alsace-Champagne-Ardenne-Lorraine, Philippe Richert’s list (LR, das Républicains) benefited native a “tactical vote”, greatly prevailing in the seconde round. In Bourgogne-Franche-Comté and Centre-Val ns Loire, the center-left lists beat auto FN list passant par two et five point respectively in a tight seconde round, narrowly avoiding a takeover ns the local councils par the far-right. Finally, in Nord-Pas-de-Calais-Picardie and Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur, where thé FN’s showing was auto highest, thé far-right perform were seul defeated in the seconde round at auto cost of année unprecedented “democratic sacrifice”: between the two rounds, auto center-left perform withdrew à give the center-right lists an advantage. This relocate allowed thé outgoing g / d party venir win the majority of seats marqué prevented thé PS et its allies any representation.

The latest polls published in anticipation of the june 2021 frais des sondages."> 10 elections give thé RN (le Rassemblement denchères or national Rally, previously the intérieur Front or FN) 25% ns votes nationwide, which is 5 point less than its mirroring in 2015. Auto RN has a good joie of to win in at least three regions. In Hauts-de-France, thé list de Sébastien Chenu (RN) to be tied v that de Xavier bertrand (LR) in the seconde round in a recent study commet des sondages."> 11 . In Normandy, the list led by Nicolas bay (RN) would obtain le 3 points less than that of hervé Morin (LR) les élections région en Normandie, technical notice, 9 célibataire 2021."> 12 . In Centre-Val ns Loire, Aleksandar Nikolic’s (RN) candidat would be on a par with the centre-left candidat in a four-party seconde round les élections régional en Centre-Val de Loire, technological notice, 9 june 2021."> 13 . In Bourgogne-Franche-Comté, Julien Odoul (RN) could additionally win in together a scenario les élections régionales en Bourgogne-Franche-Comté, technological notice, 9 juin 2021."> 14 . In Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur, thé list de Thierry Mariani (RN) is given auto lead in auto first et second ring in toutes les personnes scenarios, receiving up venir 51% ns the voter les élections régionales en Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur, technical notice, 9 june 2021."> 15 . Such a instance will oz again require the center-left lists à withdraw in order venir ensure that the RN take a minority position, recreating thé problem ns 2015. Auto scenario ns regional leadership shifting to thé far-right currently has to be serious considered.

The 2015 election as such saw condition b) outlined above, concerning the FN’s inability à win in the second round, come to be less relevant. This trend need to be evidenced in 2021.

Polarized three-way partisanship

Since 2017, the français political party système has undergone far-ranging changes. Thé center-left (ecologists aside) has come to be greatly divided. With les République en aller (LREM), a party with a social-liberal leaning has emerged at the centre of thé political landscape. Esquive Verts (the vert Party) have gained influence, broken away from thé PS and partly reoriented themselves. La france Insoumise (FI) has asserted itself oui the main actor du the de base left. Finally, thé LR, déchiré between that Christian-democratic et national-conservative factions, is currently at a crossroads.

In this context, état a) regarding the strict left-right division, is no plus long met. The dissolution of the old dichotomy, thé strengthening of esquive Verts, and the emergence ns a centrist renforcer of between 15% and 25% in current polls is reshuffling auto cards: in a scenario where non list wins année absolute majority of seats, new forms of centrist agreements between thé PS, LR-UDI, LREM-MoDem, and ecologists are now conceivable. Thé LREM et MoDem (Mouvement Démocratique or Democratic Movement) lists, peut être of forming special alliances with each du the two blocs, deserve to take marche in a range of majorities. Have to a revenir to a proportional système be considered, the difficulties de forming ligue will certainly be less than they to be when an exacerbated left-right divide prevailed.

The guarantee of an absolute majority following the second roundAt auto same time, with thé emergence du a centrist bloquer independent de the classic center-left and center-right ones, follow me with the increasing stress within each du these political forces, the alors of second rounds where four, jaune perhaps even five, parties will complete is likely à significantly increase. Thé RégioTrack inspection conducted by OpinionWay in April 2021 says that, barring alliances, it is most likely that four lists will be in auto running in the lundi round in june 2021 in each de mainland France’s regions excluding Corsica, with the produire of auto Hauts-de-France RégioTrack vague 5, may 2021."> 16 . In every case, the four parties jaune groups pertained to are all the same: center-left and Les Verts, LR et its allies, LREM-MoDem and RN. Cette is most likely that in some du these lundi rounds, that ne sont pas party attains 33% of votes, i beg your pardon is auto threshold needed to secure an absolute majority de seats. According to the latest polls, this case could happen in Normandy, Pays ns la Loire, énormément Est et Bourgogne-Franche-Comté, where the leading lists in the seconde round only obtain 32% of the vote. In two est différent regions (Centre-Val ns Loire, nouvelles Aquitaine), thé score du the leading perform varies in between 34 and 36%, which also makes such a script possible.

In order venir understand thé emerging patterns du this four-party seconde round, nous can take into consideration the election outcomes in Normandie ont projected de the most recent polls. Consider, à la example, auto OpinionWay poll ns April 2021 esquive intentions ns vote convectif les élections régionales en Normandie, April 2021."> 17 . According to this survey, thé list ns the outgoing president (LC-LR-MoDem) would win would victory 49 seats, against 19 à la the RN, 17 pour the left-wing list, et 17 parce que le LREM. IN order à reach the absolute majority du 52 seats, auto center-left list should team up with another list, many likely the LREM, after auto election. Si the seat were split in a totally proportional manner based nous the results of the lundi round (or with a threshold de 10% pour the first round), auto center-right and LREM together would obtain 54 seats, permitting them venir form a bulk while restoring a more representative balance of power in the assembly et its majority.

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With auto emergence of a four-party system, état c), guaranteeing a majority of seats to thé leading list in the lundi round will no longer be applicable oui of thé 2021 election. Ont we ont seen with thé example ns the local council in Normandie, thé current voting système will no plus long be able à guarantee an absolute majority à any du the lists following the lundi round. Post-election coalitions, which will certainly then need à be negotiated, will regularly be the same oui what would oui happened with a proportional one-round vote. This scenario, i beg your pardon in thé worst boîte could concern up à half de the regions of mainland la france following thé election, says that thé added value de the current system ns proportional depiction is increasingly weak in terms ns executive stability.

Critical regions

Eighth image: regional council de Provence-Alpes-Côtes d’Azur (proportional seconde round, projection)

The added value du the current système is also an extremely weak in regions, such as Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur (PACA), where auto RN is in a emplacement to win the election. According to recent opinion polls, the election in paca could lead to either an absolute majority à la the RN (in caisse of a second-round victory), or an absolute majority à la LR jaune LR-LREM after auto left-wing perform are removed in the lundi round.

Conversely, si this were a une round proportional election through a threshold of 6% jaune 10%, seats can be distributed oui follows: 20 seats to auto left and ecologists, 47 seats venir the joint list ns the center-right and 56 to auto RN. In order à obtain the majority de 62 seats, a post-election alliance between auto two lists de the left and center-right will be necessary. However, this ligue is exactly thé same ont that would certainly be necessary venir prevent the RN native winning an absolute majority. When a partie of auto center and right pouvez find ce convenient to consider a unilateral withdrawal of the left-wing list, cette is i can not qualify that auto latter will certainly definitively relinquish tous representation in the absence of a quid professionnel quo. In PACA, the threat of an RN leadership, created by the device of the majority bonus, can seul be impede in thé long-term de restoring auto proportionality of the allocations of votes — et by reviving auto much-needed conversation between politics factions.

The three hachette a), b), and c) which, in 1999, fabriqué the two-round voting system with majority prime in line with its objectives are no plus long present today. Far from guaranteeing auto stability ns the local executive branch et limiting the RN’s ability à act, thé current electoral system 1) does no guarantee a stabilité majority in thé current four-party system; 2) risks leading to the election de RN leadership, also though this party does no represent auto majority of auditeur opinion; 3) force withdrawal tactics which harm the representativeness de assemblies; 4) will eventually lead venir post-election negotiation similar to those that would take place with a single-round proportional système with a threshold ns 10%; 5) maintain the hallucination that transpartisan conversation is useless jaune even dangerous.

An unrepresentative, unpredictable, and overly strategy system

Added to toutes les personnes this is thé weakness innate in thé inadequate proportionality du voting. Auto two-round election et the 25% majority bonus given to thé first-place list in the seconde round warps the power balance within the assemblies. Vice versa, the livré of seats et votes in between 1986 and 1999 complied with a comparable pattern, the change to thé electoral system in 1999 created significant disparities which seul benefited the far-right. Et so, in 2004 et 2010, thé center-right and right bloquer received a proportion ns seats between 5 and 10 point below that is share de votes, while auto center-left et left bloquer captured up à 15 point more. In 2015, with thé rise of the parliamentary right in plenty of areas, this trend was reversed: this time it was the center-right et the appropriate which earned more seats (43%) than votes (32%) while thé center-left, left, et ecologists for the life time uncovered themselves contempt worse la fin (35% du seats parce que le 38% of votes). In 2021, with the presence of a fourth political bloquer (LREM-MoDem), over there is a hasardeux that this trend will certainly become an ext acute. Si the parliamentary right can oz again hope à gain an advantage from auto current electoral system, auto center-left — and especially the center LREM-MoDem — blocs risk taking a share ns seats that is frais below your actual electoral representation. The new or cultivation political blocs have everything to lose in a system which systematically deprives them of any far-reaching representation, weakening your ability à negotiate, and forcing lock into alliance which space costly in terms de their independence.

With meugler proportional representation, auto electoral outcomes are additionally unpredictable. With seul one voter in the seconde round, a quarter of seats can échanger hands, make future distributions in the assembly very difficult à predict. This threshold effect creates an uncertainty the the partie try venir control passant par focusing conditions météorologiques a couple of key regions et by intensifying tactical manoeuvres. Cible this gives précis incentive parce que le political les pièces to be more accountable et to project themselves into thé future.

The instance is even more an essential in regions, such oui PACAS, wherein maintaining thé “cordon sanitaire”, leads to auto withdrawal of avec certitude lists. In auto current local council for PACA, around a third of voters that went to the polls have no representative from the party they voted parce que le in the sapin round. De contrast, thé LR-UDI-MoDem-CPNT list, which received 27% du the voter in the tons round, finished up v 66% ns the seats. Such discrepancies make ne sont pas sense democratically when nous consider je vous demande pardon would have been auto “organizational cost” of maintaining the “cordon sanitaire” in thé proportional voting system: the need parce que le the right and left blocs to communicate in post-election negotiation in order à vote nous budgets, as well as the need venir reach agreements on major regional issues. In terms de democratic quality, the seconde solution, i m sorry restores at one the representative nature of auto assembly — meaning respect pour the expressions of universal sondage — et the need à la transpartisan conversation on problem of auditeur interest, is much more preferable than the sapin solution which places the executive, management in auto hands du a strong minority there is no giving the withdrawing list any type of capacity à la negotiation.

By imposing facility strategic calculations conditions météorologiques the various political parties, thé two-round voting système with majority crème diverts attention away indigenous the de nombreux issues de a campaign. Discussions over auto possibility du a pre-election LR-LREM ligue région en Paca: l’alliance entré LR rang LREM fait vivement réagir, les Figaro, 2 peut être 2021."> 18 , auto appropriateness de string messaging venir avoid an RN win in the second round Régionales: Eric Dupond-Moretti, candidats dans das Hauts-de-France convectif «chasser les RN», les Monde, 7 peut faire 2021."> 19 , jaune even or nous the alliance terms between the PS et ecologists alliance avec das Verts: Chesnais-Girard mis sous pression, les Télégramme, 9 April 2021."> 20 ont stirred up auditeur opinion much an ext in auto beginning of 2021 than abondance campaigns. Already partly hijacked native its regional function through the media’s presentation ns it ont a “dress rehearsal” pour the 2022 presidential elections, the regional electoral projects are gift stripped de their autonomous significance through exclusive emphasis conditions météorologiques technical considerations. The political parties, along with their candidates, space forced à draw a transpartisan roadmap before even knowing the real electoral weight de these groups. They also face à face considerable uncertainty, and the two days given to thé lists à create alliance following the sapin round is too brief a temps window for any severe negotiations.

Finally, auto practice of découper lists between center-left and center-right bloquer in the first round, i m sorry is a tactical consequence of the high retention threshold introduced passant par the 1999 reform, is detrimental to ascertaining various political trends et makes it pas possible to calculation their true level of representation. Thé true weight of MoDem in certain center-right alliances, et those du the Greens with auto PCF (Parti communisme Français) in bien sur center-left alliances is difficult venir determine. Therefore, nous what basis can the negotiation and distribution du roles in between these different groups it is in built? comment can parties (particularly centrist) think about multiple alliance which would allow them à obtain a majority? thé problem seems unresolvable under auto current electoral system.

Allow the return de a proportional system

With the lack du transparency à la citizens, complications for parties, low levels of representation, and its contribuera to focus pre-election debate nous strategic considerations quite than issues, auto two-round majority prime voting système appears more and more as an obstacle to democratic local government. In contrast, returning à a proportional system would limit auto magnitude du pre-election strategies, ease et simplify the work ns different political parties and, over all, make auto campaign much more understandable venir citizens. Restoring proportional depiction would postpone interparty negotiations till after thé election, with a set deadline, but certainly plus long than thé current two-day duration dedicated venir merging lists, with full knowledge du the balance du power. Centrist les pièces would as such be able venir participate in a variety de majorities based nous their actual depiction in auto regional electorate.

This change in système would certainly require questioning of état d) outlined above, concerning the “fear of instability” which defined electoral revolutionary under auto 5th Republic. But this questioning is vital because the current party système is much more complex, fragmented, and abondance than auto three-way système that has longue prevailed and is incompatible with thé current poll system. Thé electoral division — an interpretation among the citizens — is a political, social, and economic reality that legislation cannot erase jaune silence. Restoring each political party’s true representative nature and requiring chosen officials to make clear agreements based nous the balance of power does not typical betraying the electorate’s desire pour stability. On the contrary. Ce is accepting auto reality de a politically split society and working à restore dialogue between the different forces that entendu it in order à reach the necessary compromises. Thé fear of instability resulting from auto diversity de opinions is, above all, a fear ns democracy.

In année increasingly abonde French political system, characterized passant par the emergence of social-liberal renforcer independent of the two classic bloquer (LREM-MoDem), du ecologist partie asserting their own identity (Les Verts), du a de base left i beg your pardon is distinct from social-democrats (LFI), et distinctive independent forces, it is ending up being imperative to se remettre the spirit of coalitions and transparent negotiations. Without such a change, this democratically intractable dilemma in between weak representation in the assemblies et ungovernability will certainly remain. The introduction of a proportional system parce que le the local councils would be a first step in the direction. Raising thé specter ns the fourth Republic and its proverbial instability in this context is to kid oneself: proportional equipment are thé most usual ones in europe parliamentary regimes et democracies, a regional council is not the intérieur Assembly, and proportional voting has already been used, in a context marked by an even greater left-right divide in between 1986 et 1998.

However, si proportional representation were à be restored, it is precious considering further institutional alters that can be implemented à improve the way auto assemblies function once proportional representation is reinstated. There is no going into thé details of such a consideration, nous will suggest here a series ns directly applicable measures.

The current method ns electing auto regional executive, management branch (president et vice-president du the local council) already provides parce que le a facile majority sondage in the third round de voting. Cette is because of this not important to échanger the current method ns election à guarantee the election de a local executive. Auto instability it was observed prior venir 2004 mainly pertained to the budget vote, parce que le which a block vote device was introduced conditions météorologiques a provisional basis. This device allowed local leadership to adopt a budget without a vote unless the parliament passed a “constructive” movement of la censure — i.e., one which mentions thé name de a nouveau regional Council president action n° 99-36 ns 19 janvier 1999 relative à mode d’élection des conseillers régionaux et des conseillers jusqu’à l’Assemblée de Corse et venir fonctionnement des conseils régionaux, JORF n°16 from 20 January 1999."> 21 . In order venir guarantee thé adoption du a budget in the absent of a seul party majority we could:

restore together a blocked voter mechanism in a sustainable way de adapting it;impose auto automatic dissolution ns a regional Council et hold early voter in auto event that a budget vote is not possible; this would enable voters à directly address the deadlock in auto assembly;introduce a mechanism ns automatic “provisional twelfths”, inspired de the Belgian strategy 22 . In thé event that the budgets cannot it is in voted on, this would carry out automatically adopted monthly appropriations based nous the critical full-year budget.

More generally, it is significativement to be certain that the complementary reforms introduced will encourage transparent deteriorate (coalition jaune special agreement) and discourage obstructionist behavior, while at the same time providing année emergency systems in the event that an agreement can not be reached.

Furthermore, thé prominent role of the local president in thé regional executive, management branch could be an obstacle à establishing well balanced coalitions. Contrasted to thé German, Spanish, or Italian assemblies, french regional councils are unique in that they à faire not oui a true, cohesive “regional government” in which there is a clear attribuer of powers. In the auditeur opinion, seulement un the regional president is perceived oui having executive, management power, while thé standing committees of the regional councils, composed at least du the president and the vice-presidents, room not an extremely visible. This hybrid role ns the vice-presidents, who space both “regional ministers” as well as being responsible parce que le organizing sessions, leader to the election of all the vice-presidents from auto ranks of the majority, contrary to thé practice in the national Assembly and in many European assemblies. The num of vice-presidents (between 13 and 15 in tous mainland regions) periodically reach a third de the size du the majority party and the executive. This blurring of executive et legislative attributes not only marginalizes the role of the regional opposition, but also makes the assembly’s structurellement unclear because of the proliferation du delegations. In the case of a multi-party coalition, the distribuer of duties would be lot clearer — et much more easily negotiated — if a much more collegial et cohesive the supervisory board took over executive functions, different from the function du vice-president du the assembly. A precedent exists in this regard: that du the Assembly and the executive, management Council of the collectivity du Corsica. Auto two vice-presidents of the Corsican Assembly have a purely parliamentary function, while auto eleven executive, management councilors (including the president) oui clearly created government responsibilities. The dispensés of position among the various partie following the 2015 territorial voter demonstrated this model’s capacity to encourage the dispensés of responsibilities amongst several parties. Such a system could easily be applied to toutes les personnes French regions.

Political Cost

It must be listed that even considerations ns pure political possibility cannot be année obstacle venir the introduction of together reform, since the current electoral system is année obstacle to the work of each of the left, center, et right politics parties:

It practically systematically steal the de base left du parliamentary representation en raison de to the difficulty du reaching the seconde round;It requires auto center-left (PS et allies) venir give up any representation in thé event of a showdown between the center-right et the far-right, at auto risk de seeing auto RN win thé executive with a relative majority;It limits auto capacity ns the Greens à present live independence lists and to establish various post-electoral alliances, a emplacement that would however give cette a crucial role as arbiter;It threats depriving the centre (LREM, MoDem) du executive functions wherever it does no reach année agreement with one ns the blocs beforehand. Instead ns being a vital partner in negotiations et post-election coalitions on thé right and left in a super number ns regions, the centre will be under-represented in most ns them;Within thé center-right of the best (LR, UDI et allies) ce is bring about unprecedented tension oui a result of the need to form alliance ahead of the election.

The present electoral system, designed to resolve a specific crisis case at the beginning of the 2000s, is no plus long relevant. The état that justification its introduction are no longer present, and its effects conditions météorologiques citizen trust, auto level du representation de assemblies, thé work de parties, and the high quality of auditeur debate are mainly negative. This “democratic artifice” is no longer up à contemporary challenges. Cette must as such be reformed.

Voir plus: Film Another Country Histoire D Une Trahison, Another Country : Histoire D'Une Trahison

Propositions

We as such suggest:

Starting in 2027, à restore a one-round proportional representation système at auto regional level, v a threshold ns 5% jaune 10%;To establish, in order venir guarantee auto vote de the regional budget in the absent of a clear majority: one of two people a blocking suffrage mechanism (absolute bulk given to a counter proposal necessary to prevent the adoption of the budget presented par the executive); one of two people a mechanism parce que le the automatic dissolution of the local council in thé event the a budget cannot it is in passed; jaune a mechanism ns temporary budget automatically allocated (principle du “provisional twelfths”) in the absent of a complete budget;To develop in tous French regions année executive council de 10 à 15 members based nous the Corsican ar model, which would replace the current permanent commet in thé regional executive functions, and limit the num of vice-presidents of the local council venir 5;To increase auto awareness of french national and regional politicians, ont well as public opinion, du the need parce que le more frequent, more structured, and more contractualized post-electoral agreements, which have become considérablement due venir the évolution of the party system.